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Abstract
The purpose of this qualitative study was to examine the phenomenon of enhanced, risk-based Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
oversight of Part 145 repair stations in Oklahoma that performed aircraft maintenance for Part 121 air carriers. Specifically, this research
was utilized to explore the lived (personal) experiences of Part 145 repair station managers concerning operational changes in air carrier
maintenance practices. The researchers’ intent was not to examine the effectiveness of changes implemented by the FAA; instead, to
explore how management has experienced the enhanced changes in their Oklahoma-based Part 145 repair stations. Forty-two percent of
the participants indicated a weak FAA oversight system that has hindered the continuous process improvement program in repair stations.
Some of them were financially burdened after hiring additional full-time quality assurance inspectors to specifically manage enhanced
FAA oversight. Notwithstanding, the participants of the study indicated that the FAA must apply its surveillance on a more standardized
and consistent basis. They want to see standardization in how FAA inspectors interpret regulations and practice the same quality of
oversight for all repair stations, particularly those that are repeat violators and fail to comply with federal aviation regulations. The
participants believed that when the FAA enforces standardization on a consistent basis, repair stations can become more efficient and safer
in the performance of their scope of work for the U.S. commercial air transportation industry.
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Introduction
A safe and trustworthy air transportation system is important for America’s national security and economic success.
The United States (U.S.) air transportation industry suffered a series of financial setbacks as a result of the 9/11 terrorist
attacks, the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts, and a sporadic U.S. economy; resulting in the escalation of jet fuel expenses and
even higher costs of conducting in-house air carrier maintenance (Richardson, Park, Moore, & Pan, 2014). Experts estimated
monetary losses in the U.S. air carrier industry between 2000 and 2009 were $54 billion (Borenstein, 2011; GAO, 2009).
Those losses caused many U.S. air carrier managers to change their operational strategies by outsourcing all or most of their
aircraft maintenance to Part 145 repair station industry and non-certificated repair facilities (Al-kaabi, Potter, & Naim, 2007).
Over 70% of U.S. air carrier maintenance has been outsourced to Part 145 repair stations, also known as maintenance,
repair, and overhaul (MRO) facilities, to perform airline maintenance at a lower cost (Williams, 2012). Part 145 repair
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stations are aviation maintenance facilities that have been
certified by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
under Title 14, Aeronautics and Space, Code of Federal
Regulation (CFR) Part 145 (GPO, 2015). Outsourcing
maintenance to repair stations and noncertified facilities has
become economically viable for the success of the airline
industry based on affordability; it has saved the airline
industry up to 67% in (labor) costs (GPO, 2012; McFadden
& Worrells, 2012; OIG, 2005).
The management concept behind the benefits of a FAA
certificated Part 145 repair station is the perception that
it will perform superior maintenance in comparison to a
non-FAA certificated facility. However, it has been mostly
Part 145 repair stations (not uncertificated facilities) that
have been responsible for several airline mishaps due to
outsourced maintenance errors (McFadden & Worrells,
2012). These mishaps have created national debate about
the FAA and its ability to provide adequate oversight on
those repair stations that pose the greatest safety risks.
Statement of the Problem
During the late 1990s, significant safety concerns igni-
ted a national debate after a ValuJet DC-9 crashed in the
Florida Everglades. Accident investigators discovered that
ValuJet outsourced its aircraft maintenance to SabreTech,
a repair station maintenance contract provider; SabreTech
contractors were the primary contributors of the mishap.
SabreTech failed to properly prepare, package, and identify
unexpended oxygen generators (hazardous material) before
placing them in the ValuJet’s cargo compartment that led to
an in-flight fire and subsequent crash (GAO, 1997). Avia-
tion critics have stressed that additional FAA oversight is
needed at Part 145 repair stations that perform outsourced
aircraft maintenance for U.S. air carriers (McFadden &
Worrells, 2012). After 9/11, many air carriers outsourced
their in-house maintenance to repair station contractors to
reduce operational (labor) costs, resulting in the occurrence
of additional mishaps and incidents. This alarming trend
has given rise to concerns about decreased levels of safety
in the U.S. commercial aviation industry (GAO, 1997;
McCartney, 2004; OIG, 2013).
Background and Significance of the Problem
The U.S. air carrier industry has experienced long-term
financial hardships since the 9/11 2001 terrorist attacks,
ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and high jet fuel
costs (Richardson et al., 2014). As a result, Borenstein
(2011) said the air carrier industry lost billions of dollars of
revenue between 2000 and 2009. These events have prom-
pted U.S. air carriers to outsource their in-house main-
tenance to contract maintenance providers (Part 145 repair
stations and non-certificated repair facilities) in excess of
70% (Williams, 2012). McCartney (2004) and McFadden
and Worrells (2012) said that even though airlines have
become more reliant upon repair stations to perform out-
sourced maintenance to reduce labor costs by 67%, the
FAA has not increased its surveillance across the full spec-
trum of repair station and non-certificated repair facility
operations (GAO, 1997; GPO, 2012; OIG, 2007, 2010,
2013).
By 1997, the Government Accounting Office (GAO),
a governmental watchdog agency over the FAA, discov-
ered that FAA inspectors used outdated regulations to
evaluate repair stations with concepts that were developed
during the infancy of the aviation industry. The GAO
discovered that since 1962, federal regulations had not been
properly updated to reflect airframe, powerplant, and com-
ponent design changes to include alteration concepts and
new technology. They also identified 86 out of 86 (100%)
FAA safety inspectors who admitted that they used out-
dated regulations to inspect contract maintenance providers
at Part 145 repair stations. These findings, as well as other
safety concerns, prompted the FAA to spend over $30
million to develop the Air Transportation Oversight System
(ATOS) as its new surveillance program to improve the
oversight of repair stations (GAO, 1997; McFadden &
Towell, 1999; OIG, 2002, 2003). The purpose for ATOS
was to spot safety trends before accidents occur, as well as
creating inspection plans specific to an airline’s strengths
and weaknesses.
In October 1998, the FAA began implementing ATOS in
the U.S. aviation maintenance industry, focusing inspec-
tions on the areas of highest risk (OIG, 2003). An area of
high risk could be a repair station that has repeat violations
or performs maintenance on flight safety sensitive compo-
nents such as engines or flight controls that—if repaired,
rigged, or overhauled incorrectly—could result in an air-
craft mishap.
Five years later during 2003, the FAA’s inadequate
oversight of contract maintenance providers was apparent
again after the Office of Inspector General (OIG), another
governmental watchdog agency over the FAA, discovered
18 out of 21 (86%) repair stations that had repeat findings,
improper parts, and faulty equipment, partially due to
inadequate FAA oversight. In response to this (2003) OIG
report, the FAA began to create and implement a new risk-
based process intended to provide comprehensive and stan-
dardized oversight of repair stations. However, even though
the FAA moved its safety oversight toward a risk-based
process, it still relied too heavily on air carriers’ oversight
procedures, which was not always sufficient.
Since implementing risk-based oversight process, the FAA
developed a tool for inspectors, called the Repair Station
Assessment Tool (RSAT). Initiated in 2007, the RSAT,
while developed as an enhancement to assist inspectors
with planning surveillance and analyzing risk, has resulted
in limited effectiveness due to its original design. Thus,
inspectors can only complete the RSAT once a year and
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cannot update changes in risk assessments until the fol-
lowing year. As a result, the RSAT has not proven useful
for the inspectors attempting to monitor changes in risk
levels occurring throughout the year; it has hindered the
FAA’s ability to conduct effective risk-based oversight
(OIG, 2013).
Purpose of Study
Even after the efforts of the FAA in implementing new
surveillance and risk-based oversight processes, three addi-
tional U.S. air carrier mishaps occurred between 2000 and
2003 due to outsourced maintenance errors. Trends anal-
ysis data by the FAA have indicated the possibility of
future mishaps based on 34 air carrier flights that resulted
in declared emergency landings after engine and landing
gear malfunctions due to outsourced maintenance errors;
those errors were considered widespread after 19 declared
emergency landings from engine failures and 15 landing
gear malfunctions between 2007 and 2014 (FAA, 2015a).
The OIG has continued to uncover systematic and repeat
findings concerning unsafe maintenance practices (inade-
quate training and maintenance, and improper equipment
and parts) by contract maintenance providers due to inade-
quate FAA oversight (OIG, 2013). Nevertheless, airlines
are legally responsible by federal regulations for their air-
craft deemed not airworthy, even if the maintenance was
performed by contractors (GPO, 2015).
Even though the FAA has made attempts to upgrade its
safety oversight with a risk-based system (ATOS) and an
assessment tool (RSAT) to further enhance the risk-based
oversight process (Table 1), the FAA has continued to
place more emphasis on in-house airline maintenance
facilities, where less than 30% of the maintenance has
been accomplished, in comparison to the 70% that was
outsourced to other (external) repair facilities.
There is no literature concerning the personal experi-
ences of Part 145 repair station managers who have over-
seen outsourced U.S. air carrier maintenance in Oklahoma
after the FAA changed procedures with its risk-based over-
sight system in 2007. Therefore, the purpose of this study
was to explore the actual (professional) experience of
Part145 repair station managers concerning changes in out-
sourced Part 121 air carrier maintenance practices between
2007 and 2014 after the FAA enhanced its risk-based over-
sight system in 2007.
The researchers’ intent was not to examine the effec-
tiveness of changes implemented by the FAA or to conduct
an inquiry of non-certificated repair facilities; instead, it was
to explore how management has experienced the enhanced
changes in their Oklahoma-based Part 145 repair stations.
Methodology
Since the methodology of this study consisted of a
qualitative field study, a small sample of managers from
the Oklahoma Part 145 repair station industry were inter-
viewed with seven semi-standardized, open-ended ques-
tions (Appendix A). The interview questions were used to
generate data and comprehend the intricacies of enhanced,
risk-based FAA oversight and outsourced maintenance prac-
tices at repair stations.
Research Question
The central research question of this study consisted of
the following: What are the actual (professional) experi-
ences of Part 145 repair station managers in Oklahoma
Table 1




An FAA risk-based system arranged by data analysis (U.S. air carrier
operations and maintenance data) to focus on oversight areas that
pose the greatest safety risks to effectively maximize the agency’s




The FAA enhanced its risk-based system with a risk assessment tool
to aid in the surveillance of U.S. repair stations that perform outsourced
aircraft maintenance for the U.S. air carrier industry.
2007a
Notes. Prior to 1998, the FAA inspection program was compliance-based and did not focus on risks. During 2015, the FAA started replacing ATOS with its
new Safety Assurance System (SAS) in an attempt to correct the administration’s flawed oversight system of the U.S. air transportation system. As of 2015,
there were 474 Part 145 repair stations in Europe that performed work on U.S. registered aircraft and components. The FAA has not provided adequate
training for its inspectors to conduct surveillance at European repair stations with foreign authorities. Adapted from ‘‘Advancing FAA’s Risk-Based
Oversight Systems’’ by the Office of Inspector General, 2002, FAA Oversight of Passenger Aircraft Maintenance, Report Number: CC-2002-146, p. 7;
‘‘FAA Developed Risk-Based Inspection Tools, but the Tools Are Ineffective and Inspectors Do Not Use Them’’ and ‘‘Agency Comments and Office of
Inspector General Response’’ by the Office of Inspector General, 2013, FAA Continues to Face Challenges in Implementing a Risk-Based Approach for
Repair Station Oversight, OIG Report Number: AV-2013-073, pp. 6 and 16; and ‘‘FAA’s Monitoring of EU-Based Repair Stations is Impeded by Training,
Procedural, and Data Quality Weaknesses’’ by the Office of Inspector General, 2015, FAA has not Implemented Repair Station Oversight in the European
Union, OIG Report Number: AV-2015-066, p. 8.
aSince 2007, the FAA has incorporated a risk assessment tool known as the Repair Station Assessment Tool (RSAT) to enhance the risk-based oversight
process.
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concerning changes in outsourced Part 121 air carrier main-
tenance practices between 2007 and 2014 after the FAA
enhanced its risk-based oversight system in 2007?
Sample and Population
The FAA is responsible for the safety oversight of 4,062
U.S. Part 145 repair stations (OIG, 2013). Of those 4,062
repair stations, 127 are located in Oklahoma where appro-
ximately 42 (33%) provide MRO services for the U.S. airline
industry (FAA, 2015b). Part 145 repair station managers
who oversaw outsourced aircraft maintenance for domestic
air carriers were randomly sampled and interviewed from the
pool of 127 repair stations in Oklahoma. These managers
normally have the highest level of knowledge of the orga-
nization and interaction between FAA inspectors and their
repair station employees.
The researchers utilized the Stat Trek website as an
analytical tool to generate a table of 127 random numbers
(Stat Trek, 2015). Next, the snowball sampling method was
utilized to select Part 145 repair station managers who had
at least five years of experience overseeing outsourced
Part 121 air carrier maintenance. The researcher randomly
sampled and interviewed managers from a pool of 127
repair stations in Oklahoma where they performed high-
risk outsourced air carrier maintenance on various airframe,
powerplant, radio, instrument and accessory components,
and metal plating; data saturation occurred with the twelfth
participant of the study.
Dawson (2009) said a sample size should be limited to a
saturation point when no new explanations or ideas have
appeared from the study. Saturation occurs when repetition
of the data from multiple sources of data becomes apparent
with repetition in the information obtained and with con-
firmation of previously collected data. The twelve repair
station managers interviewed provided the level of repeti-
tion and saturation necessary to adequately address the seven
open-ended interview questions, as well as the central research
question of this study.
Instrumentation for Data Collection
The primary instrument used to gather data for this study
consisted of semi-structured, open-ended questions. These
interview questions were created to specifically probe the
participants for their actual (professional) experience of
enhanced, risk-based FAA oversight. Before interviews
could be conducted, the researchers employed the Delphi
method. It consisted of questionnaires to evaluate the
clarity of the research questions by a panel of three experts
(Table 2) from the FAA, Part 145 repair station industry,
and Oklahoma Aeronautics Commission.
The Delphi method was used to research and gather expert
opinions for rich details through the experts’ voices (Boje &
Murnighan, 1982; Delbecq, Van de Ven, & Gustafson, 1975;
Patton, 2015). In this study, the Delphi method consisted of
three rounds with three expert panelists who reviewed,
revised, and authenticated the open-ended research ques-
tions. Round one involved the preliminary feedback by these
experts to validate if the research questions would clearly
invoke an open-ended response. Round two resulted in
several revisions by the panelists to streamline the research
questions, resulting in 42% of the questions being eliminated
or streamlined. Round three was the final session. All three
panelists agreed the remaining seven research questions were
sufficient for the study and would clearly evoke an open-
ended response by participants of the study.
Validity and Reliability of the Study
Triangulation was used in a four-step process to increase
the validity and confidence of this study. Patton (2015) found
that triangulation will strengthen a study by combining
methods, as well as used to improve the trustworthiness of a
researcher’s analysis. Step one involved the investigator
triangulation of three expert aviation members who inves-
tigated, revised, and authenticated the research questions.
Step two consisted of a mock interview with a quality direc-
tor at a Part 145 repair station in Oklahoma. The purpose
of a mock interview was to receive additional feedback to
increase the credibility of the data (Seidman, 2006). Step
three was comprised of the data triangulation of one GAO
audit report and 11 OIG audit reports, 12 participant inter-
views, four NTSB accident reports, and the Accident and
Incident Data System (AIDS) and Aviation Safety Informa-
tion Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) database. Step four con-
sisted of investigator triangulation with three triangulating
Table 2
Expert panelists.
Name Aerospace Experience in Oklahoma Total Years
Panelist 01 Part 145 repair station quality director
13 years in RS
27 years in aviation
27
Panelist 02 FAA FSDO ASI
12 years in FAA
20 years in aviation
20
Panelist 03 Oklahoma Aeronautics Commissioner
5 years in OAC
42 years in aviation
42
Notes. RS 5 Repair station. FSDO 5 Flight Standard District Office. ASI 5
aviation safety inspector. OAC 5 Oklahoma Aeronautics Commission.
Panelists 01, 02, and 03 had extensive experience, knowledge, and training
related to aircraft maintenance management and human factors; thus, they
were considered experts in their current occupations. Panelists 01 and
02 had significant knowledge of Part 121 air carrier and Part 145 repair
station operations while Panelist 03 had limited knowledge of Part 121 and
Part 145 to increase the likelihood of a non-biased view of the FAA and
repair stations under FAA security. Panelist 03 was a governor-appointed
Oklahoma Aeronautics Commissioner who had extensive knowledge of
aerospace management concepts to include aeronautical safety and devel-
opment and frequent coordination with the FAA to develop a national
system of civil aviation.
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analysts (researcher, and evaluators A and B) and one peer
reviewer to evaluate the consistency of the data.
Findings
Demographics
Table 3 briefly lists the professional background of the
12 participants from the repair station industry in Oklahoma.
Repair Station Participant Analysis
Interview Question 1 (IQ1). How long have you been
associated or employed with the Part 145 repair station
industry? The first interview question illustrates the years
of professional experience each manager had in the Part 145
repair station industry. The quality of participant background
and professional experience are directly related to the ability
to obtain meaningful data for the study. The years of expe-
rience for each manager ranged between 7 and 40 years, with
an average of 20 years for the 12 participants (Table 4).
Interview Question 2 (IQ2). What changes in Part 145
repair station aircraft maintenance practices have you
observed before the FAA’s implementation of its enhanced,
risk-based oversight system in 2007? As the participants
shared their professional experiences, an overwhelming
majority of the participants (92%) indicated an unfavorable
response with inconsistent levels of standards among FAA
inspectors. The primary finding of this interview question
specified that the FAA did not consistently apply a stan-
dardized surveillance process within the Part 145 repair
station industry before 2007.
According to participants RSM01 and RSM06, the FAA
failed to incorporate a standardized process to conduct
routine repair station audits with checklists that would have
facilitated a clear and structured inspection agenda. Parti-
cipant RSM04 said the quality of FAA audits was lacking
in comparison to primary legacy air carrier audits. FAA
inspectors, according to participant RSM05, had placed less
emphasis on human factors training before 2007 while
participant RSM02 stated how Part 145 did not depend on
Table 3
Repair station managers.
RSM Participants Education Military Aerospace Experience Employees
Name M/F Cert Degree Br, Rnk, Per (Executive Managers) Total
RSM 01 M A&P U.S. Army Quality director 13 years
in RS 27 years in aviation
571
RSM 02 M A&P U.S. Air Force
(contractor)
Accountable manager 40 years
in RS 50 years in aviation
32
RSM 03 F A&P BS - Av Mgmt U.S. Army major Accountable manager 7 years
in RS 21 years in aviation
5
RSM 04 M BS - Mech Eng Accountable manager 20 years
in RS 28 years in aviation
50
RSM 05 M A&P BS - HR Accountable manager 20 years
in RS 28 years in aviation
4
RSM 06 F A&P BS - Acct Quality director 16 years
in RS 16 years in aviation
31
RSM 07 M A&P BS - Bus Admin Accountable manager 13 years
in RS 29 years in aviation
5018
RSM 08 M RM Quality director 22 years
in RS 40 years in aviation
93
RSM 09 M Quality director 11 years
in RS 30 years in aviation
561
RSM 10 M U.S. Navy PO2
6 years
Quality director 12 years
in RS 30 years in aviation
63
RSM 11 M A&P MBA U.S Air Force
4 years
Accountable manager 20 years
in RS 39 years in aviation
322
RSM 12 M A&P Accountable manager 35 years
in RS 35 years in aviation
7
Notes. Accountable manager 5 a designated (FAA mandated) duty position at Part 145 repair stations. RSM 5 repair station manager. A&P 5 Airframe &
Powerplant certified mechanic rating by the FAA. RM 5 Repairman mechanic rating from the FAA. MBA 5 master of business administration. BS 5 bachler
of science. RS 5 repair station. HR 5 human resource. AV Mgmt 5 aviation management. Mech Eng 5 mechanical engineer. Cert 5 Federal Aviation
Administration Certificate. Bus Admin 5 business administration. Serv 5 service. Yrs 5 years. PO2 5 Petty Officer Second Class. Br 5 branch (military
affiliation). Rnk 5 rank (military rank). Per 5 period (military term of service).
Table 4
Participants: Number of years in repair station.
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other supporting documents such as Federal Aviation
Regulation Part 43 that provides additional maintenance
and preventive maintenance regulations.
Six of the participants (RSM06, RSM08, RSM09, RSM10,
RSM11, and RSM12) had the same response as participant
RSM07 who said FAA inspectors would haphazardly select
low-risk repair stations to audit with little to no emphasis
placed on efforts to identify high-risk repair stations, espe-
cially repeat offenders.
Interview Question 3 (IQ3). What changes in Part 145
repair station aircraft maintenance practices have you
observed after the FAA’s implementation of its enhanced,
risk-based oversight system in 2007? Fifty percent (6 of 12)
of the participants believed there were inconsistent stan-
dards among the FAA inspectors. The belief that the FAA
has not been consistent with applying a standardized surve-
illance process at all participants’ repair stations would
become a significant finding of the study.
Of the six participants, participants RSM01 and RSM02
complained about ineffective FAA inspectors who had con-
flicting interpretations of federal regulations to define the
significant meaning of overhauled and how it was linked to a
required test because it was not clearly defined by the agency.
For example, the participants said their repair stations were
hindered by FAA inspectors who disagreed with other agency
inspectors about the qualifying criteria that constituted an
overhauled aircraft, component and subcomponent, and proper
disposition of the required maintenance documentation.
One of the participants (RSM06) has become extremely
frustrated with FAA inspectors who did not understand
the basic concepts of chrome plating used in critical appli-
cations in the repair station, i.e., aircraft landing gear parts.
Participant RSM09 mentioned how documented mainte-
nance in the repair station has doubled since 2007, while
participants RSM08 and RSM10 remembered multiple FAA
auditors who conducted infrequent inspections and had
conflicting interpretations of federal regulations.
Participants RSM11 and RSM12 discreetly agreed that
any outcome of the risk-based FAA oversight change
depended upon the FAA’s approach to address it. They
implied that redundant inspections have plagued the
domestic Part 145 repair station industry because the FAA
and other audit agencies did not communicate as a whole,
and frequently duplicated their inspections within a six-
month time period. Also, the frequency of FAA inspec-
tions has been remarkably lower at foreign Part 145 repair
stations due to budgetary constraints by the agency to
travel overseas. The participants said manpower con-
straints have prevented the FAA from conducting routine
inspections at U.S. and foreign maintenance facilities that
performed outsourced aircraft maintenance for the U.S.
air carrier industry. During 2013, there were 449 foreign
Part 145 repair stations and 474 in 2015 (OIG, 2015).
Participant RSM01 found it necessary to hire two addi-
tional quality assurance auditors to cope with the enhanced
risk-based FAA oversight. These full-time auditors increa-
sed the efficiency of the organization by 94% after reducing
its lost employee work days from 100 to six days. Aircraft
maintenance damage incidents of dropped engines and sheet
metal drilling errors were reduced from 63 to 4 events, and
worker compensation costs decreased from $600,000 to less
than $100,000 per year.
Interview Question 4 (IQ4). What advantages have you
noticed from enhanced risk-based FAA oversight at your
repair station between 2007 and 2014? An overwhelming
majority (75%) of the participants indicated the efficacy
of the enhanced FAA oversight, especially in the improve-
ment of audits, quality, and safety within their organiza-
tions. Participants RSM11 and RSM12 stated the FAA
began to replace the ATOS with the Safety Assurance
System (SAS) during 2015 as its new risk-based system to
advance the U.S. air transportation system. According to
the participants, SAS should improve the efficacy of the
FAA’s oversight of Part 121, 135, and 145 operations with
enhanced audits, improving the safety and quality of the
U.S. air transportation system.
Interview Question 5 (IQ5). What disadvantages have
you noticed from enhanced risk-based FAA oversight at
your repair station between 2007 and 2014? Over half of
the participants (67%) experienced excessive burden with
the enhanced oversight. As a 40-year veteran, participant
RSM02 said the majority of new-generation FAA inspectors
have limited technical skills and favor non-critical adminis-
trative audits such as records management, as opposed to
evaluating an aviation technician’s performance of a critical
maintenance task, to validate and verify regulatory com-
pliance. This participant also said the majority of new FAA
inspectors have limited hands-on Airframe and Powerplant
(A&P) experience and lack the necessary practical knowl-
edge to understand basic maintenance concepts, whereas the
older generation inspectors are considered Subject Matter
Expert by trade and are actively engaged in promoting civil
aviation.
A personal experience was discussed by participant
RSM05 who had become upset after the FAA Office of
Aerospace Medicine Drug Abatement Division audited his
drug program and issued him a $6,000 fine. In addition,
three participants (RSM04, RSM08, and RSM09) agreed
that their time was hindered by lengthy and wasteful audits
by FAA inspectors who were not sufficiently prepared to
conduct their inspections. Participant RSM07 said the lack
of common sense by the FAA was a disadvantage and it
has burdened the U.S. air transportation system when the
agency does not understand and fully comprehend basic
maintenance processes in the repair station.
The next two participants (RSM11 and RSM12) were
hampered since the FAA does not normally share repair
station audit results internally with their inspectors and
externally with the civil aviation community for the pur-
pose of trend analysis. They believe the FAA should place
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more emphasis on high-risk repair stations or frequent
offenders with a standardized process to share audit
findings and systemic concerns with the Part 145 repair
station industry. The remaining four participants (RSM01,
RSM03, RSM06, and RSM10) did not acknowledge any
disadvantages from the enhanced oversight by the FAA.
Interview Question 6 (IQ6). How do you feel about the
argument to increase the frequency of FAA inspections
at Part 145 repair stations to improve the safety of the U.S.
air transportation industry? Participant RSM02 planned to
fib to FAA inspectors if they resort to web-based desktop
audits verses on-site repair station inspections based on the
agency’s limited resource of inspectors. And participant
RSM03 said the FAA should hire more inspectors to
provide better surveillance of the Part 145 repair station
industry. The rest of the participants (RSM04, RSM05,
RSM06, RSM07, RSM09, RSM10, RSM11, and RSM12)
complained about the excessive amount of time spent on
FAA inspections and other audit agencies since they are
unwilling to share inspection data results; whereas, if they
had shared data, those inspectors could have prevented
redundant inspections and wasteful man hours.
Interview Question 7 (IQ7). What would you like to add
as a further opinion that was not covered during this inter-
view? Approximately forty percent (42%) of the partici-
pants (RSM05, RSM06, RSM08, and RSM12) said their
continuous process improvement program was mired by
inadequate FAA oversight at their Part 145 repair stations.
For instance, they were concerned with the FAA’s inadeq-
uate oversight of domestic air carrier maintenance after it
has been outsourced to a Part 145 repair station that will
often contract it to a noncertified maintenance facility to
perform critical maintenance.
Inadequate training for inspectors was a concern to one-
third of the participants (RSM01, RSM02, RSM03, and
RSM04). Participant RSM01 was worried about the new
generation of FAA inspectors who may have some college
education or a degree; however, they would not possess the
necessary A&P hands-on experience. Participant RSM02
wanted to see a change in the A&P certification process,
requiring all aviation maintenance technicians (AMTs) who
are employed by the Part 145 repair station to successfully
complete an on-the-job training apprenticeship program.
This training program, according to the participant, should
include specific content about aviation standards, proper
usage of tools, regulatory requirements, maintenance docu-
mentation, communication classes to improve the produc-
tivity of the aviation workforce, and techniques to improve
the audit experience by reducing or eliminating personal
stress levels associated with audits.
Summary and Conclusions
Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. air transportation
industry has experienced significant hardships from high
maintenance costs to operate air carrier jetliners. The OIG
has become increasingly concerned with this rise in avia-
tion maintenance outsourcing and decreased safety of
domestic air carriers due to several U.S. airline mishaps,
uncovering systemic gaps in the FAA’s oversight system,
which has hindered its ability to adequately monitor the
increased practice of outsourced maintenance by the Part
145 repair stations (GAO, 1997; OIG, 2013). The OIG
(2003, 2005, 2013) determined that more FAA oversight
would possibly reduce the likelihood of additional
accidents, as well as the FAA’s issuance of several million
dollars in civil penalties to domestic repair stations and
U.S. air carriers found to be in violation of substandard
aircraft maintenance. Not surprisingly, the FAA agreed
with recommendations from the GAO and the OIG to cor-
rect significant gaps in the U.S. air transportation system to
properly monitor outsourced aircraft maintenance for dome-
stic air carriers at Part 145 repair stations (GAO, 1997; OIG,
2013).
Consistent with the purpose of this study, the data find-
ings provided a snapshot of the actual (professional) expe-
rience of Oklahoma Part 145 repair station managers who
oversaw outsourced U.S. air carrier maintenance between
2007 and 2014. The 12 station managers who participated
in this study had between 7 and 40 years of experience in
the domestic Part 145 repair station industry. Cumulatively,
they had an aggregate total of 6,757 employees and 236 years
of repair station management experience.
The overwhelming majority (92%) of the participants
agreed that the FAA’s level of standardization established
for the repair stations lacked overall consistency. Speci-
fically, the participants believed that the FAA inspectors
failed to follow a standardized surveillance process during
their visits to Part 145 repair stations in Oklahoma, indi-
cating that the FAA’s policy of an enhanced risk-based
oversight system, after 2007, was also lacking in terms of
similar quality and effectiveness of oversight before 2007.
The participants were frustrated with inadequate and inef-
fective oversight because the FAA inspectors continuously
chose not to follow a mandated and consistent risk-based
audit process. Furthermore, half of the participants voiced
their concerns about inconsistent standards among all FAA
inspectors, stating that when FAA inspectors interpreted
federal regulations, they were frequently inconsistent with
other FAA inspectors. According to the participants, some
of the younger-generation FAA inspectors had a much dif-
ferent interpretation of federal regulations than the older-
generation FAA inspectors. Several of the participating
repair station managers agreed that if FAA inspectors col-
lectively enforced policies of standardization and inter-
preted regulations accurately, their repair stations would be
more productive and safer, as would all other repair stations
associated with the U.S. air transportation system.
Atypically, FAA inspectors often relied on their own
personal knowledge of repair stations to conduct audits and
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communicate the results of those inspections. As a result,
FAA’s oversight of the repair stations lacked the stan-
dardized rigor needed to identify deficiencies and verify
corrective actions. At the same time, according to the parti-
cipants, the FAA has not developed or enforced a con-
sistent and reliable process for placing its inspectors at
repair stations that are more susceptible to risk or have a
history of violations.
The findings also suggested that high operational costs at
several Part 145 repair stations presented the opportunity
for them to compromise safety at the expense of quality
against probable financial consequences (loss of profits)
due to inadequate FAA oversight. Revenue operations nor-
mally have the predisposition to value these things alike,
which has the tendency to compromise safety. Therefore,
when a premium is placed on time and money, safety can
likely be neglected within the repair stations, even though
most of the participants understood that their safety and
quality management systems go hand-in-hand. Without these
systems in place, it becomes extremely difficult to maintain a
safe and airworthy aircraft.
Some of the participants stated that the OIG was rightly
justified to promote their increased audits of the FAA due
to its inadequate oversight of the Part 145 repair station
industry. These participants also indicated they were
burdened by FAA inspectors who did not initially perform
standardized inspections, as well as the invasive nature of
unproductive audits. However, some of the participants
experienced some improvements with the efficacy of their
repair stations from the enhanced risk-based FAA over-
sight. In addition, the participants agreed that the decision
to increase audits was legitimate and helped their Part 145
repair stations improve their quality and safety systems to
produce reliable products. Yet, some of the repair station
mangers made it clear that the improvements were only pos-
sible after they hired their own additional quality inspectors
to conduct more internal audits.
Although the FAA implemented an enhanced risk-based
oversight system in 2007, under the umbrella of ATOS, to
assist its safety inspectors in focusing on those Part 145
repair stations that posed a higher risk, findings from this
study indicated that this current FAA oversight system does
not guarantee timely and accurate risk assessments of the
higher risk repair stations. And due to weaknesses in the
oversight system, FAA inspectors are not effectively tar-
geting surveillance to repair stations with the greatest risk.
In conclusion, outsourcing maintenance by the airline
industry has been a good business practice as a whole
for Part 145 repair stations or noncertified repair facilities
to contractually inherit airline maintenance as their core
business function. As McCartney (2004) and McFadden
and Worrells (2012) previously stated, the FAA has not
increased its surveillance across the full spectrum of repair
station and non-certificated repair facility operations while
the airlines have become more reliant upon the MRO
industry to perform outsourced maintenance at a reduced
(labor) cost (GAO, 1997; OIG, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010,
2013). As repair stations have become an integral part of
airline maintenance, the significant finding of this study
indicated that the current FAA risk-based oversight system
has not followed a standardized process and lacks the nece-
ssary training for their inspectors to effectively use the
oversight system tools, further hindering the inspectors’
ability to conduct acceptable repair station risk assessments
(OIG, 2013). Until the FAA modifies its inspection pro-
gram and follows a standardized process, additional lapses
of FAA oversight will continue to occur in U.S. repair
stations (Hung & Chen, 2013).
Recommendations for Future Research
The findings of this study produced some additional
unanswered questions, calling for additional research. The
following topics, in the opinion of the researchers, warrant
further study:
Further Study #1:
Further research regarding FAA oversight on Part 145
maintenance practices beyond the state of Oklahoma should
be conducted to determine if the perception patterns of Part
145 repair station managers, identified in this study, are
limited to Oklahoma; research should examine the char-
acteristics of domestic and foreign repair station managers
who oversaw outsourced aircraft maintenance for dome-
stic air carriers at U.S. and foreign Part 145 repair stations.
Research should also examine the cost of business diffe-
rential between U.S. and foreign repair stations.
Further Study #2:
Beginning in January 2016, the FAA SAS became the
new oversight program for Part 145 repair stations, pro-
viding inspectors with standardized protocols to evaluate
the certificated stations. SAS was designed to take a data-
supported/risk-based approach for routine operator surveil-
lance, providing FAA inspectors with the capability to
determine potential safety issues, assess and analyze the root
cause of safety concerns, and take appropriate action with
perceived safety-related risks.
A future research study could examine the FAA’s
replacement of its ATOS with SAS and determine if the
new safety system has improved the sharing of safety data
between the FAA and the aviation maintenance commu-
nity, focusing on how to better assess and mitigate safety
concerns or risks associated with U.S. and foreign repair
stations.
Further Study #3:
On April 6, 2006, all U.S. certificated repair stations
were required to have and use an employee training
program approved by the FAA that consisted of initial and
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recurrent training (Legal Information Institute, 2014). This
required FAA training program was implemented to ensure
each employee could perform their assigned maintenance
and preventive maintenance, alteration, and inspection
tasks. In an effort to assist the stations in complying with
this requirement, the FAA provided the necessary guidance
and recommendations for establishing this new training
program. However, the FAA’s attempt to compromise on
training requirements at smaller, less complex repair
stations without reducing the training offered by the
larger repair stations could cause legitimate concern with
how these training program requirements are being inter-
preted within the aviation maintenance industry (O’Brien,
2006).
It became apparent during this study that the number of
trained, certified, and experienced AMTs from Part 145
repair stations may not be keeping pace with the expansion
of the aviation maintenance industry such as the develop-
ment and implementation of newer technologies regarding
aircraft design and performance. During 2015, 6,009 of
11,340 (53%) noncertified AMTs were employed through-
out 127 repair stations in Oklahoma (Table 5). The OIG
(2013) has identified systemic and repeat findings of
insufficient mechanic training of noncertified AMTs through-
out the U.S. repair station industry. The FAA does
not require AMTs to have an FAA mechanic certificate
unless they inspect or supervise maintenance (FAA,
2003,2015b).
Additional research studies focusing on the elements and
functions that constitute an effective training program for
repair station employees, including the recommended amount
of training, could provide the necessary data to assist repair
station managers, and those responsible for ensuring safe and




1. How long have you been associated or employed
with the Part 145 repair station industry?
2. What changes in Part 145 repair station aircraft main-
tenance practices have you observed before the FAA’s
implementation of its enhanced, risk-based oversight
system in 2007? Clarification: Describe what a typical
FAA inspection looked like before 2007 and how
FAA oversight impacted your repair station (i.e.,
compulsion to hire additional personnel or modify
management practices).
3. What changes in Part 145 repair station aircraft main-
tenance practices have you observed after the FAA’s
implementation of its enhanced, risk-based oversight
system in 2007? Clarification: Describe what a typi-
cal FAA inspection looks like today and how FAA
oversight impacts your repair station (i.e., compul-
sion to hire additional personnel or modify manage-
ment practices).
4. What advantages have you noticed from enhanced,
risk-based FAA oversight at your repair station between
2007 and 2014?
5. What disadvantages have you noticed from enhan-
ced, risk-based FAA oversight at your repair station
between 2007 and 2014?
6. How do you feel about the argument to increase the
frequency of FAA inspections at Part 145 repair sta-
tions to improve the safety of the U.S. air transpor-
tation industry? Clarification: The Office of Inspector
General (OIG) has been advocating for an increase in
FAA surveillance of repair stations since 1998. Recent
reports by the OIG indicate that future increases in
surveillance will be necessary.
7. What would you like to add as a further opinion that
was not covered during this interview?
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